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Perspective 
Synopsis of the Report of the Second 
Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and 
Ethnic Fairness in the Courts 
Jay C. Carlisle* 
The recent Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gen- 
der, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts ("Ta~kforce")~ ob- 
serves "some biased conduct toward parties and witnesses 
based on gender or race or ethnicity has occurred on the part of 
both judges and lawyers." "Biased conduct toward lawyers 
based on gender or race or ethnicity, has occurred to a greater 
degree."2 The Report concludes that such conduct is unaccept- 
able and admonishes all participants in the Second Circuit 
courts to  guard against it.3 The purpose of this Perspective is to 
review several sections of the Rep01-t.~ The Perspective is writ- 
ten from an informative, not an analytical, standpoint and is 
intended to summarize the status of key issues raised by the 
Task Force. 
* Jay C. Carlisle is a Professor of Law at the Pace University School of Law. 
He was a member of the Gender Subcommittee on the Court as Employer for the 
Working Committee to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness. 
1. See Preliminary Draft Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, 
Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, June 7, 1997 bereinafier "Task Force 
Reportn (on file in the Pace University School of Law, Law Review Office). 
2. Id. at  42. 
3. Id. a t  43. 
4. See id. a t  Chapter Four entitled The Baruch Report: Survey Results of Ob- 
servations and Opinions of Judges, Lawyers, Law Clerks, and Courtroom Deputies 
and Chapter Nine, entitled Complaints. 
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I. , Introduction 
In the fall of 1993 the Second Circuit Judicial Council5 
voted unanimously to  create a Task Force on Gender, Racial 
and Ethnic Fairness composed of seven Judicial officers and 
three attorneys.6 The Judicial Council's action was prompted 
by a 1992 resolution by the Judicial conference of the United 
States which warned that bias, in all of its forms, presented a 
danger to the effective administration of justice in federal 
 court^.^ Similarly, in early 1994 Congress passed the Violence 
Against Women Act and specifically asked federal courts to 
study "the nature and extend of gender bias."8 
The Task Force recognized the difficulties of asking Second 
Circuit judges to evaluate themselves and asked members of 
the bar and legal academics to complete an independent investi- 
gation and to submit their report to the Task Force.9 By July of 
1994 approximately sixty volunteers from throughout the Sec- 
ond Circuit had been selected and spent 1995 and 1996 study- 
ing specific areas. The Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, 
Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, was submitted on 
5. At the time of the vote, the Judicial Council for the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit consisted of Chief Circuit Judge Newman; Circuit Judges 
Kearse, Cardamone, Winter, Miner, Altimari, and Mahoney; Schif District Judges 
Griesa, McAvoy, Platt, Cabranes, Telesca, and Parker. 
6. The members of the Task Force were the Honorable Sharon E. Grubin (Co- 
Chair), the Honorable John M. Walker, Jr. (Co-Chair), the Honorable John T. Cur- 
tin, the Honorable Sterling Johnson, Jr., the Honorable Constance Baker Motley, 
the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, the Honorable Lawrence W. Pierce, Ellen Mercer 
Fallon, Esq., Fern Schair, Esq. and Sue Ann Shay, S.D.N., Esq. Judge Pierce 
retired prior to issuance of the Report and is not listed as a member of the Task 
Force. 
7. See Task Force Report, supra, a t  note 1, a t  1. 
8. 42 U.S.C. 3 14001. 
9. The volunteer group is referred to as the Working Committees to the Sec- 
ond Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts. 
Sheila L. Birnbaum, Esq. was named as the Executive Director. John H. Doyle, 
Esq. and Bettina B. Plevan, Esq. were named as co-chairs of the Gender Commit- 
tee. Professor Diane L. Zimmerman of the New York University School of Law was 
named as Reporter for the Gender Committee. William J. Snipes, Esq. and Hector 
Willems Rodriguez, Esq. were named as co-chairs of the Racial and Ethnic Com- 
mittee. Professor Beryl Jones of Brooklyn Law School was named as Report to the 
Racial and Ethnic Committee. Special Assistants for both committees were Ms. 
Sharon Arnoldi, Ms. Paula Gerard and Ms. Amy D. Hundert. Professor Carroll 
Seron of Baruch College of the City University of New York served as the commit- 
tees' Social Science Advisor. 
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June 5,1997, and is referred to as Exhibit "A" of the Task Force 
Report. Also, a survey was undertaken by experts from Baruch 
College of the City University of New York ("the Baruch Re- 
p0rt")lO and written questionnaires were sent to all judicial of- 
ficers, law clerks, courtroom deputy clerks, and all other court 
employees in the circuit. Finally a telephone survey of lawyers, 
with a written follow-up to  non-respondents, was conducted by 
Louis Harris and Associates and this data was then presented 
to focus groups around the circuit.ll The Baruch Report was 
submitted in June of 1997 and is referred to as Exhibit "B" of 
the Task Force Report. Exhibit "C" to the Report was prepared 
by the Employment Economics Division of Price Waterhouse 
LLP on November 21, 1996 and is entitled "Statistical Analysis 
for the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic 
Fairness in the Courts."12 
The Task Force's Report was released, with Exhibits "A,, 
"B" and "C," to the public during the summer of 1998. This es- 
say will highlight sections four and nine of the Task Force Re- 
port with particular reference to the Baruch Report. 
11. Section IV of the Task Force Report 
The objective of the Task Force study was "to examine 
whether, how, and when gender, race, or ethnicity affect the 
quality or nature of individual experience in the circuit's federal 
courts, both as to those who are involved in the litigation pro- 
cess and those who are court employees."l3 Earlier studies by 
the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force14 and the Task Force 
- 
10. This report, entitled "A Report of the Perceptions and Experiences of Law- 
yers, Judges and Court Employees Concerning Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness 
In the Federal Courts of the Second Circuit of the United Statesn bereinafter "The 
Baruch Report"] was completed in June of 1997 and is on file in the offices of the 
Pace University School of Law, Law Review. 
11. See id. 
12. Id. 
13. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 5. 
14. See The Preliminary Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force 
(1992). The Ninth Circuit study demonstrated a "complexu picture about the ways 
in which gender affects professional interactions between judges and attorneys. 
The authors of that report argued that gender adds an extra dimension that is 
often discomforting and sometimes destructive to female counsel. They summa- 
rized their findings as follows: "Taken together, these data suggest that women 
and men in the Ninth Circuit perceive the same world differently or inhabit differ- 
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on Racial and Ethnic Bias and Task Force on Gender Bias in 
the Courts for the District of Columbia had reported systematic 
and persistent differences in the perceptions of men and women 
and white and minority judges.15 A New York State Task Force 
on Women in the Courts found "gender bias against women liti- 
gants, attorneys and court employees is a pervasive problem 
with grave consequences."16 Thus, the Second Circuit Task 
Force commissioned an elaborate survey by the School of Public 
Affairs at  Baruch College. The primary investigative technique 
of the Baruch Report was the distribution of detailed question- 
naires to judges, lawyers and those court employees in a posi- 
tion to observe courtroom conduct. 
The response rate for these groups were as follows: (1) Sev- 
enth three percent of the judges responded. (2) Seventy three 
percent of courtroom deputy and law clerks responded. (3) Sev- 
enty percent of assistant United States attorneys and public de- 
fenders responded and (4) a significant number of attorneys 
who had filed appearances or participated in Second Circuit 
courts in 1995 responded.17 
A. Overview of the Findings 
White male judges and white male attorneys consistently 
responded that gender and racelethnicity do not matter.18 They 
"tend to believe that the federal courts of the Second Circuit are 
color and gender blind toward those who practice in it."19 How- 
ever, some female judges and most female attorneys reported 
observing a court where gender frequently compromised the 
fairness of proceedings in the Second Cir~uit.~O The findings 
ent worlds, one characterized by feelings of exclusion and the other by feelings of 
acceptance." The Preliminary Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force 
(1992:6). 
15. See Final Report of the Task Force on Racial and Ethnic Bias and Task 
Force on Gender Bias in the Courts (District of Columbia, 1992). 
16. Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORD. 
Urban L. J. 1 (1986-87) (This 198 page report contains 463 footnotes and is the 
most comprehensive report on gender bias produced anywhere.) See Annual Re- 
port of The New York State Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts (Novem- 
ber 1997) (copy on file with the Pace Law Review). 
17. Task Force Report, supra note 1, a t  25-26. 
18. See The Baruch Report, supra note 10 at 25-26. 
19. Id. at 26. 
20. See id. a t  25. 
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with regard to both female and minority attorneys were as 
follows: 
white and minority female attorneys and minority male attorneys 
report that members of their own group are more disadvantaged 
than other groups. White female attorneys, for instance, observe 
that they are more disadvantaged than minority male and minor- 
ity female attorneys in private practice. Similarly, minority male 
and minority female attorneys report that they are more disad- 
vantaged than white female  attorney^.^^ 
These responses and other statistical data convinced the Task 
Force that "Notwithstanding some risk of survey error, we are 
satisfied that the Baruch Report provides a reliable basis for 
drawing the conclusions we have reached."22 These conclusions 
are as follows: 
1. Biased Conduct Directed at Parties and Witnesses 
The biased treatment of parties and witnesses comprised 
instances where a witness was (1) ignored, interrupted or not 
listened to; (2) helped or coached in a patronizing way; (3) sub- 
jected to  a sexually oriented remark; or (4) subjected to  deroga- 
tory remarks related to  gender, race, or ethnicity (including 
parodying an accent). Overall few judges and court employees 
reported biased conduct by lawyers based on gender or race or 
ethnicity directed at parties or witnesses, but 26.9 percent of 
female judges observed parties or witnesses ignored, inter- 
rupted, or not listened to by lawyers, which the judges attrib- 
uted to  racial or ethnic bias.23 
Few white male lawyers reported any bias against parties 
and witnesses. Female and minority lawyers reported biased 
conduct toward parties and witnesses by other lawyers to a 
greater degree. The Task Force stresses: 
Apart from the reported occurrences of biased conduct, the most 
significant aspect of the data on treatment of parties and wit- 
nesses is the difference between the extent to which such conduct 
is reported by white males as  compared to females and minority 
males, and by whites as compared to m i n o r i t i e ~ . ~ ~  
21. Id. at 28-34. 
22. The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 27. 
23. See id. at 28-29. 
24. Id. at 31. 
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2 .  Biased Conduct Directed Against Lawyers 
The Baruch Report presented data as to what lawyers re- 
ported they themselves have experienced and what judges, 
court employees (law clerks and courtroom deputy clerks), and 
other lawyers reported they have observed.25 Few white male 
attorneys reported experiencing bias. About one half of the fe- 
male attorneys reported they had experienced conduct based on 
race or ethnicity.26 
However, a substantial percentage of all attorneys observed 
biased conduct based on gender and race. Fifty four percent of 
white male attorneys, seventy seven percent of white female at- 
torneys, seventy nine percent of minority male attorneys and 
eighty percent of minority female attorneys reported observing 
biased treatment of other attorneys based on gender.27 Almost 
fifty percent of white female attorneys and minority male law- 
yers reported observing a female attorney mistaken for a non- 
attorney.28 Over thirty percent of white female attorneys and 
minority male and female attorneys reported observing attor- 
neys helped or coached in a patronizing way, which they attrib- 
uted to gender bias.29 Less than eight percent of white 
attorneys reported these types of gender bias.30 
Almost forty one percent of white male attorneys, fifty nine 
percent of white female attorneys, seventy eight percent of mi- 
nority male attorneys and eighty five percent of minority female 
attorneys reported observing biased treatment of other attor- 
neys based on race or ethnicity.31 Twelve percent of white male 
attorneys, twenty one percent of white female attorneys, thirty 
nine percent of minority male and female attorneys reported ob- 
serving that attorneys had been subjected to derogatory racial 
or ethnic remarks.32 Thirteen percent of white male attorneys, 
twenty two percent of white female attorneys, forty five percent 
of minority male attorneys and eighteen percent of minority fe- 
- 
25. See id. at 32. 
26. See id. at 33. 
27. See The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 34, n. 25. 
28. See id. at 34, n. 25. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. at 35, note 26. 
32. See The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 34, n. 25. 
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male attorneys reported that they have observed an imitation 
- 
or parody of manner of speech of an attorney, which they attrib- 
uted to racial or ethnic b i a ~ . 3 ~  Finally, one percent of white 
male attorneys, four percent of white female attorneys, forty 
three percent of minority male attorneys and twenty eight per- 
cent of minority female attorneys reported that they had ob- 
served attorneys helped or coached in a patronizing way, which 
they attributed to racial or ethnic bias.34 
The Task Force states that, "a significant percentage of 
lawyers reported observing biased conduct based on gender, 
race or ethnicity directed a t  other lawyers by judges and court 
employees, as well as by lawyers."35 Ten percent of white male 
attorneys, thirty six percent of white female attorneys, thirty 
one percent of minority male attorneys and forty seven percent 
of minority female attorneys reported observing biased treat- 
ment of other attorneys based on gender by judges.36 At least 
twenty percent of all attorneys, with the exception of white 
male counsel, reported observing biased treatment of other at- 
torneys based on gender by court employees.37 Seven percent of 
white male attorneys, thirteen percent of white female attor- 
neys, forty percent of minority male attorneys and forty one per- 
cent of minority female attorneys reported observing biased 
treatment of other attorneys based on race or ethnicity by 
judges. Similarly a significant number of all attorneys, with the 
exception of white male counsel, reported observing biased 
treatment of other attorneys based on race or ethnicity by court 
 employee^.^^ Finally, forty seven percent of white male attor- 
neys, sixty six percent of white female attorneys, sixty one per- 
cent of minority male attorneys and seventy seven percent of 
minority female attorneys reported observing biased treatment 
of attorneys based on gender by other attorneys.39 Twenty 
seven percent of white male attorneys, forty eight percent of 
white female attorneys, fifty four percent of minority male at- 
torneys and sixty percent of minority female attorneys reported 
33. See id. 
34. See id. at 35, n. 28-30. 
35. Id. 
36. See id. 
37. See The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 36. 
38. See id. at 36. 
39. See id. 
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observing biased treatment of attorneys based on race or ethnic- 
ity by other attorneys.40 
B. Opinions and Beliefs About Biased Treatment of Attorneys 
1. The Judges Perspective 
Most judges reported that all attorneys are treated very 
fairly. However, the percentage reporting this view dropped 
"somewhat" when the judges were asked to report whether fe- 
male and minority attorneys were treated very fairly.41 A sig- 
nificant number of female judges reported gender and racial 
bias.42 The Task Force noted that "few judges believe that law- 
yers are ever disadvantaged based on their race or sex in court 
proceedings specifically, but the percentages expressing this 
view increased somewhat when the judges were asked about fe- 
male and minority ,lawyers."43 
2 .  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The Second Circuit Task Force reached the following con- 
clusions based on the data discussed in chapter four of their Re- 
port. First, some biased conduct toward parties and witnesses 
based on gender or race or ethnicity has occurred on the part of 
both judges and attorneys. Second, biased conduct toward at- 
torneys based on gender or race or ethnicity, has occurred to a 
greater degree. Third, it is significant that far more women 
then men, particularly white men, report observing biased con- 
duct based on gender, and that far more minorities than whites 
report observing biased conduct based on race or ethnicity. 
The Task Force recommended that copies of its report and 
the appended reports, surveys and statistical data be distrib- 
uted to all judges and court persona. The Task Force urged 
them to  become familiar with the Report and exhibits and to 
take steps to minimize the type of bias reported. 
40. See id. at 37. 
41. Id. at 38. 
42. See The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 39. 
43. Id. 
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C. Chapter IX of the Task Force Report: Complaints 
1. Against Judges 
The Task Force points out that many respondents who 
have experienced or observed biased treatment by judges, attor- 
neys, and court employees in the Second Circuit have not regis- 
tered a formal complaint with the courts.44 The Task Force's 
Report alerts the bar to the Judicial Councils Reform and Judi- 
cial Conduct and Disability Act45which establishes a formal 
complaint mechanism which can be used to report misconduct 
by Article 111, bankruptcy and magistrate judges. The Report 
notes that a complainant can file a verified complaint with the 
clerk of the Court of Appeals or can register a complaint with 
the Chief Judge.46 These complaints are subject to initial 
screening and then forwarded to a special investigative commit- 
tee composed of the Chief Judge along with Court of Appeals 
and District judges appointed in equal numbers by the Chief 
Judge. The Judicial Council can sanction the accused judge in a 
number of ways short of removal from office. Petitions to appeal 
from the Judicial Council's decision can be made to the United 
States Judicial C~nference.~' 
The Task Force makes three recommendations to en- 
courage reporting of incidents of race, ethnicity and gender bias 
on the part of judges: 
First, the courts should consider whether the initial screening 
process, currently administered solely by the Chief Judge, might 
be expanded to include review by a committee of lawyers. This 
might enhance public confidence in the complaint process. Sec- 
ond, whoever performs the initial screening process should be 
careful not to overlook genuine complaints of gender or race bi- 
ased conduct which (because of inartful drafting by a complainant 
not trained in the law) may appear to argue only the merits of the 
complainant's case. . . Third, to encourage those who may be de- 
terred from registering complaints of misconduct because they 
44. See id. a t  43. 
45. See The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 106 ("Between 1991 and 1995, 
371 misconduct complaints were filed against judicial officers, and only 22 raised 
allegations of race or gender bias. All bias complaints, like all complaints gener- 
ally, were dismissed as relating to the merits of the case, frivolous, or unsupported. 
In fact, 98.6 percent of all complaints filed are dismissed." Id. at 106, n. 105. 
46. See 28 U.S.C. 5 372(c). 
47. See The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 107. 
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fear reprisal, the courts should set out clearly the circuit's rules 
on the alternative mechanism for triggering the complaint with 
the chief judge who conducts a preliminary investigation to deter- 
mine whether there is sufficient independent evidence of miscon- 
duct to trigger the Section 372 pro~eedings."~8 
2. Against Lawyers 
The Task Force Report points out that most courts in the 
circuit have some procedure to  register complaints regarding 
misconduct of attorneys. Several courts have established griev- 
ance committees comprised of lawyers and judges to  investigate 
attorney misconduct claims. Also, referral to state disciplinary 
committees is an option in every district. Nonetheless, the Task 
Force Reports that, "even where they exist, the district court 
grievance committees rarely receive reports of misconduct by 
lawyers". The Task Force recommends that each court formal- 
ize and publicize its policy for registering and investigating 
complaints of attorney misconduct. 
3. Against Court Employees 
The Task Force states, "No court in this circuit has a formal 
procedure to receive complaints about discriminatory conduct 
by court employees." Instead court employees must seek infor- 
mal assistance by writing to the clerk of the court in the district 
or to the supervisor of the employee or agency for whom he or 
she works. This procedure has resulted in very few complaints. 
D .  Suggested Procedure 
The Task Force recognizes that "any unwillingness of ag- 
grieved persons to report biased conduct creates problems for a 
court." The Task Force then recommends that the courts in the 
Second Circuit establish a uniform, formal mechanism to con- 
sider complaints about court employees. Finally, the Task 
Force recommends that each court in the circuit adopt a rule 
noting the circuit's disapproval of any conduct which is gender 
or racially biased. Also, the Task Force recommends that each 
court in the circuit declare its intent to take corrective action 
where appropriate. The Report recommends the following rule: 
48. Id. 
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It shall constitute misconduct for a lawyer to: 
1. commit, during the representation of a client in the Second 
Circuit, any verbal or physical discriminatory act, on account 
of race, ethnicity, or gender if intended to improperly intimi- 
date litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, opposing 
counsel or other lawyers or to gain a tactical advantage; or 
2. to engage, in the course of representing a client in a matter in 
the Second Circuit, in any continuing course of verbal or phys- 
ical discriminatory conduct, on account of race, ethnicity, or 
gender, in dealings with litigants, jurors, witnesses, court per- 
sonnel, opposing counsel or other lawyers, if such conduct con- 
stitutes harassment. 
111. Conclusion 
The Task Force recognizes that "Bias can be conscious or, 
in the more likely case, unconscious." The Task Force states, 
The foregoing definition is followed by a pertinent quote from the 
English educator Sir Walter Moberly: "the most pernicious kind 
of bias consists in falsely supposing yourself to have nonen. This 
observation is the crux of the Task Force's four year research car- 
ried out by a cross-section of distinguished members of the Second 
Circuit's bench and bar. The detailed results of statistical data 
and focus group research speak for themselves. Few, if any, white 
male judges and attorneys believe there is any gender, racial or 
ethnicity bias in the circuit. At least twenty five percent of female 
judges and much higher percentages of female attorneys report 
incidents of gender and racial bias. Even higher percentages of 
minority attorneys report incidents of gender and racial bias. 
The Task Force notes that as of 1990 there are 26,575 fe- 
male attorneys in the circuit and that 25,078 are white. Also, 
the Task Force notes that as of 1990 there are 76,283 male at- 
torneys in the circuit and 72,507 are white. Thus, as of 1990, 
there are at least 8,000 minority (hispanic, black, indigenous, 
asiadpacific islander) attorneys in the circuit and at least 27.3 
percent of all attorneys in the circuit are women. These census 
figures will have dramatically increased by the year 2000. Con- 
sequently it is fair to suggest that at  least 35 percent of all at- 
torneys in the circuit have perceptions and experiences with 
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respect to gender and racial bias which are very different from 
white male attorneys. The question, not answered by the Task 
Force Report, is what actions, if any, can be pursued to address 
these differences. 
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